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Abstract
We propose a new input perturbation mechanism
for publishing a covariance matrix to achieve (, 0)-
differential privacy. Our mechanism uses a Wishart dis-
tribution to generate matrix noise. In particular, we
apply this mechanism to principal component analy-
sis (PCA). Our mechanism is able to keep the posi-
tive semi-definiteness of the published covariance ma-
trix. Thus, our approach gives rise to a general pub-
lishing framework for input perturbation of a symmet-
ric positive semidefinite matrix. Moreover, compared
with the classic Laplace mechanism, our method has
better utility guarantee. To the best of our knowledge,
the Wishart mechanism is the best input perturbation
approach for (, 0)-differentially private PCA. We also
compare our work with previous exponential mecha-
nism algorithms in the literature and provide near opti-
mal bound while having more flexibility and less com-
putational intractability.
1 Introduction
Plenty of machine learning tasks deal with sensitive in-
formation such as financial and medical data. A common
concern regarding data security arises on account of the
rapid development of data mining techniques. Several data
privacy definitions are proposed in the literature. Among
them differential privacy (DP) has been widely used (Dwork
et al. 2006). Differential privacy controls the fundamental
quantity of information that can be revealed with chang-
ing one individual. Beyond a concept in database security,
differential privacy has been used by many researchers to
develop privacy-preserving learning algorithms (Chaudhuri
and Monteleoni 2009; Chaudhuri, Monteleoni, and Sarwate
2011; Bojarski et al. 2014). Indeed, this class of algorithms
is applied to a large number of machine learning mod-
els including logistic regression (Chaudhuri and Monteleoni
2009), support vector machine (Chaudhuri, Monteleoni, and
Sarwate 2011), random decision tree (Bojarski et al. 2014),
etc. Accordingly, these methods can protect the raw data
even though the output and algorithm itself are published.
Differential privacy (DP) aims to hide the individual infor-
mation while keeping basic statistics of the whole dataset.
Copyright c© 2016, Association for the Advancement of Artificial
Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.
A simple idea to achieve this purpose is to add some spe-
cial noise to the original model. After that, the attacker, who
has two outputs generated by slightly different inputs, can-
not distinguish whether the output change comes from the
artificial noise or input difference. However, the noise might
influence the quality of regular performance of the model.
Thus, we should carefully trade off between privacy and util-
ity.
No matter what the procedure is, a query, a learning al-
gorithm, a game strategy or something else, we are able to
define differential privacy if this procedure takes a dataset as
input and returns the corresponding output. In this paper, we
study the problem of designing differential private principal
component analysis (PCA). PCA reduces the data dimen-
sion while keeping the optimal variance. More specifically,
it finds a projection matrix by computing a low rank approx-
imation to the sample covariance matrix of the given data
points.
Privacy-preserving PCA is a well-studied problem in the
literature (Dwork et al. 2014; Hardt and Roth 2012; 2013;
Hardt and Price 2014; Blum et al. 2005; Chaudhuri, Sar-
wate, and Sinha 2012; Kapralov and Talwar 2013). It out-
puts a noisy projection matrix for dimension reduction while
preserving the privacy of any single data point. The extant
privacy-preserving PCA algorithms have been devised based
on two major features: the notion of differential privacy
and the stage of randomization. Accordingly, the privacy-
preserving PCA algorithms can be divided into distinct cat-
egories.
The notion of differential privacy has two types: (, 0)-DP
(also called pure DP) and (, δ)-DP (also called approximate
DP). (, δ)-DP is a weaker version of (, 0)-DP as the former
allows the privacy guarantee to be broken with tiny proba-
bility (more precisely, δ). In the seminal work on privacy-
preserving PCA (Dwork et al. 2014; Hardt and Roth 2012;
2013; Hardt and Price 2014; Blum et al. 2005), the au-
thors used the notion of (, δ)-DP. In contrast, there is
only a few work (Chaudhuri, Sarwate, and Sinha 2012;
Kapralov and Talwar 2013), which is based on (, 0)-DP.
In terms of the stage of randomization, there are two
mainstream classes of approaches. The first is randomly
computing the eigenspace (Hardt and Roth 2013; Hardt and
Price 2014; Chaudhuri, Sarwate, and Sinha 2012; Kapralov
and Talwar 2013). The noise is added in the computing pro-
ar
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cedure. An alternative way is directly adding noise to the co-
variance matrix. Then one runs the non-private eigenspace
computing algorithm to produce the output. This class of
approaches is called input perturbation (Blum et al. 2005;
Dwork et al. 2014). The input perturbation algorithms pub-
lish a noisy sample covariance matrix before computing the
eigenspace. Thus, any further operation on the noisy covari-
ance matrix does not violate privacy guarantee. So far as
the flexibility is concerned, the input perturbation has bet-
ter performance because it is not limited only to computing
eigenspace. Besides, the input perturbation approach is ef-
ficient because it merely takes extra efforts on generating
the noise. In view of these advantages, our mechanism for
privacy-preserving PCA is also based on input perturbation.
Related Work
Blum et al. (2005) proposed an early input perturbation
framework (named SULQ), and the parameters of noise are
refined by Dwork et al. (2006). Dwork et al. (2014) proved
the state-of-the-art utility bounds for (, δ)-DP. Hardt and
Roth (2012) provided a better bound under the coherence as-
sumption. In (Hardt and Roth 2013; Hardt and Price 2014),
the authors used a noisy power method to produce the princi-
pal eigenvector iteratively with removing the previous gen-
erated ones. Hardt and Price (2014) provided a special case
for (, 0)-DP as well.
Chaudhuri, Sarwate, and Sinha (2012) proposed the
first useful privacy-preserving PCA algorithm for (, 0)-DP
based on an exponential mechanism (McSherry and Talwar
2007). Kapralov and Talwar (2013) argued that the algo-
rithm in (Chaudhuri, Sarwate, and Sinha 2012) lacks con-
vergence time guarantee and used heuristic tests to check
convergence of the chain, which may affect the privacy guar-
antee. They also devised a mixed algorithm for low rank ma-
trix approximation. However, their algorithm is quite com-
plicated to implement and takesO(d6/) running time. Here
d is the dimension of the data point.
Our work is mainly inspired by Dwork et al. (2014). Since
they provided the algorithms for (, δ)-DP, we seek the sim-
ilar approach for (, 0)-DP with a different noise matrix de-
sign. As input perturbation methods, Blum et al. (2005) and
Dwork et al. (2014) both used the Gaussian symmetric noise
matrix for privately publishing a noisy covariance matrix. A
reasonable worry is that the published matrix might be no
longer positive semidefinite, a normal attribute for a covari-
ance matrix.
Contribution and Organization
In this paper we propose a new mechanism for privacy-
preserving PCA that we call Wishart mechanism. The key
idea is to add a Wishart noise matrix to the original sam-
ple covariance matrix. A Wishart matrix is always positive
semidefinite, which in turn makes the perturbed covariance
matrix positive semidefinite. Additionally, Wishart matrix
can be regarded as the scatter matrix of some random Gaus-
sian vectors (Gupta and Nagar 2000). Consequently, our
Wishart mechanism equivalently adds Gaussian noise to the
original data points.
Setting appropriate parameters of Wishart distribution, we
derive the (, 0)-privacy guarantee (Theorem 4). Compared
to the present Laplace mechanism, our Wishart mechanism
adds less noise (Section 4), which implies our mechanism
always has better utility bound. We also provide a general
framework for choosing Laplace or Wishart input perturba-
tion for (, 0)-DP in Section 4.
Not only using the Laplace mechanism as a baseline,
we also conduct theoretical analysis to compare our work
with other privacy-preserving PCA algorithms based on the
(, 0)-DP. With respect to the different criteria, we pro-
vide sample complexity bound (Theorem 7) for compari-
son with Chaudhuri, Sarwate, and Sinha (2012) and derive
the low rank approximation closeness when comparing to
Kapralov and Talwar (2013). Other than the principal eigen-
vector guarantee in (Chaudhuri, Sarwate, and Sinha 2012),
we have the guarantee for rank-k subspace closeness (Theo-
rem 6). With using a stronger definition of adjacent matrices,
we achieve a k-free utility bound (Theorem 9). Converting
the lower bound construction in (Chaudhuri, Sarwate, and
Sinha 2012; Kapralov and Talwar 2013) into our case, we
can see the Wishart mechanism is near-optimal.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 gives the notation and definitions used in our paper.
Section 3 lists the baseline and our designed algorithms.
Section 4 provides the thorough analysis on privacy and util-
ity guarantee of our mechanism together with comparison to
several highly-related work. Finally, we conclude the work
in Section 5. Note that we put some proofs and more expla-
nation into the supplementary material.
2 Preliminaries
We first give some notation that will be used in this paper.
Let Im denote them×m identity matrix. Given anm×n real
matrix Z = [Zij ], let its full singular value decomposition
(SVD) as Z = UΣV T , where U ∈ Rm×m and V ∈ Rn×n
are orthogonal (i.e., UTU = Im and V TV = In), and Σ ∈
Rm×n is a diagonal matrix with the ith diagonal entry σi
being the ith largest singular value of Z. Assume that the
rank of Z is ρ (≤ min(m,n)). This implies that Z has ρ
nonzero singular values. Let Uk and Vk be the first k (< ρ)
columns of U and V , respectively, and Σk be the k × k top
sub-block of Σ. Then the m × n matrix Zk = UkΣkV Tk is
the best rank-k approximation to Z.
The Frobenius norm of Z is defined as ‖Z‖F =√∑
i,j
Z2ij =
√
ρ∑
i=1
σ2i , the spectral norm is defined as
‖Z‖2 = max
x 6=0
‖Zx‖2
‖x‖2 = σ1, the nuclear norm is define as
‖Z‖∗ =
ρ∑
i=1
σi, and the `1,1 norm is defined as ‖Z‖1,1 =∑
i,j
|Zij |.
Given a set of n raw data points X = [x1, · · · , xn] where
xi ∈ Rd, we consider the problem of publishing a noisy em-
pirical sample covariance matrix for doing PCA. Following
previous work on privacy-preserving PCA, we also assume
‖xi‖2 ≤ 1. The standard PCA computes the sample covari-
ance matrix of the raw data A = 1nXX
T = 1n
∑n
i=1 xix
T
i .
Since A is a d × d symmetric positive semidefinite matrix,
its SVD is equivalent to the spectral decomposition. That is,
A = V ΣV T . PCA uses Vk as projection matrix to compute
the low-dimensional representation of raw data: Y , V Tk X .
In this work we use Laplace and Wishart distributions,
which are defined as follows.
Definition 1. A random variable z is said to have a Laplace
distribution z ∼ Lap(µ, b), if its probability density function
is
p(z) =
1
2b
exp(−|z − µ|
b
).
Definition 2 ((Gupta and Nagar 2000)). A d × d random
symmetric positive definite matrix W is said to have a
Wishart distribution W ∼ Wd(m,C), if its probability den-
sity function is
p(W ) =
|W |m−d−12
2
md
2 |C|m2 Γd(m2 )
exp(−1
2
tr(C−1W )),
where m > d− 1 and C is a d× d positive definite matrix.
Now we introduce the formal definition of differential pri-
vacy.
Definition 3. A randomized mechanism M takes a dataset
D as input and outputs a structure s ∈ R, where R is the
range of M . For any two adjacent datasets D and Dˆ (with
only one distinct entry), M is said to be (, 0)-differential
private if for all S ⊆ R we have
Pr{M(D) ∈ S} ≤ e Pr{M(Dˆ) ∈ S},
where  > 0 is a small parameter controlling the strength of
privacy requirement.
This definition actually sets limitation on the similarity
of output probability distributions for the given similar in-
puts. Here the adjacent datasets can have several different
interpretations. In the scenario of privacy-preserving PCA,
our definition is as follows. Two datasets X and Xˆ are ad-
jacent provided X = [x1, . . . , xi−1, xi, xi+1, . . . , xn] and
Xˆ = [x1, . . . , xi−1, xˆi, xi+1, . . . , xn] for xi 6= xˆi. It should
be pointed out that our definition of adjacent datasets is
slightly different from (Kapralov and Talwar 2013), which
leads to significant difference on utility bounds. We will give
more specifically discussions in Section 4.
We also give the definition of (, δ)-differential privacy.
This notion requires less privacy protection so that it often
brings better utility guarantee.
Definition 4. A randomized mechanism M takes a dataset
as input and outputs a structure s ∈ R, whereR is the range
of M . For any two adjacent datasets D and Dˆ (with only
one distinct entry), M is said to be (, δ)-differential private
if for all S ⊆ R we have
Pr[M(D) ∈ S] ≤ e Pr[M(Dˆ) ∈ S] + δ.
Sensitivity analysis is a general approach to achieving dif-
ferential privacy. The following definitions show the two
typical kinds of sensitivity.
Definition 5. The `1 sensitivity is defined as
s1(M) = max
d(D,Dˆ)=1
∥∥∥M(D)−M(Dˆ)∥∥∥
1
.
The `2 sensitivity is defined as
s2(M) = max
d(D,Dˆ)=1
∥∥∥M(D)−M(Dˆ)∥∥∥
2
.
The sensitivity describes the possible largest change as a
result of individual data entry replacement. The `1 sensitiv-
ity is used in Laplace Mechanism for (, 0)-differential pri-
vacy, while the `2 sensitivity is used in Gaussian Mechanism
for (, δ)-differential privacy. We list the two mechanisms
for comparison.
Theorem 1 (Laplace Mechanism). Let λ > s1(M)/. Add
Laplace noise Lap(0, λ) to each dimension of M(D). This
mechanism provides (, 0)-differential privacy.
Theorem 2 (Gaussian Mechanism). For c2 > 2 ln(1.25/δ),
let σ > cs2(M)/. Add Gaussian noise N(0, σ2) to
each dimension of M(D). This mechanism provides (, δ)-
differential privacy.
The above mechanisms are all perturbation methods. An-
other widely used method is exponential mechanism (Mc-
Sherry and Talwar 2007) which is based on sampling tech-
niques.
3 Algorithms
First we look at a general framework of privacy-preserving
PCA. According to the definition of differential privacy, a
privacy-preserving PCA takes the raw data matrix X as in-
put and then calculates the sample covariance matrix A =
1
nXX
T . Finally, it computes the top-k subspace of A as the
output.
The traditional approach adds noise to the computing pro-
cedure. For example, Chaudhuri, Sarwate, and Sinha (2012)
and Kapralov and Talwar (2013) used a sampling based
mechanism during computing eigenvectors to obtain ap-
proximate results. Our mechanism adds noise in the first
stage, publishing A in a differential private manner. Thus,
our mechanism takes X as input and outputs A. Afterwards
we follow the standard PCA to compute the top-k subspace.
This can be seen as a differential private preprocessing pro-
cedure.
Our baseline is the Laplace mechanism (Algorithm 1 and
Theorem 1). To the best of our knowledge, Laplace mech-
anism is the only input perturbation method for (, 0)-DP
PCA. Since this private procedure ends before computing
the subspace, this shows M(D) = 1nDD
T in sensitivity
definition.
Note that to make Aˆ be symmetric, we use a symmet-
ric matrix-variate Laplace distribution in Algorithm 1. How-
ever, this mechanism cannot guarantee the positive semi-
definiteness of Aˆ, a desirable attribute for a covariance ma-
trix. This motivates us to use a Wishart noise alternatively,
giving rise to the Wishart mechanism in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 1 Laplace input perturbation
Input: Raw data matrix X ∈ Rd×n; Privacy parameter ;
Number of data n;
1: Draw d
2+d
2 i.i.d. samples from Lap(0,
2d
n ), then form a
symmetric matrix L. These samples are put in the upper
triangle part. Each entry in lower triangle part is copied
from the opposite position.
2: Compute A = 1nXX
T ;
3: Add noise Aˆ = A+ L;
Output: Aˆ;
Algorithm 2 Wishart input perturbation
Input: Raw data matrix X ∈ Rd×n; Privacy parameter ;
Number of data n;
1: Draw a sample W from Wd(d + 1, C), where C has d
same eigenvalues equal to 32n ;
2: Compute A = 1nXX
T ;
3: Add noise Aˆ = A+W ;
Output: Aˆ;
4 Analysis
In this section, we are going to conduct theoretical analy-
sis of Algorithms 1 and 2 under the framework of differ-
ential private matrix publishing. The theoretical support has
two parts: privacy and utility guarantee. The former is the
essential requirement for privacy-preserving algorithms and
the latter tells how well the algorithm works against a non-
private version. Chiefly, we list the valuable theorems and
analysis. All the technical proofs omitted can be found in
the supplementary material.
Privacy guarantee
We first show that both algorithms satisfy privacy guar-
antee. Suppose there are two adjacent datasets X =
[x1, . . . , v, . . . , xn] ∈ Rd×n and Xˆ = [x1, . . . , vˆ, . . . , xn] ∈
Rd×n where v 6= vˆ (i.e., only v and vˆ are distinct). Without
loss of generality, we further assume that each data vector
has the `2 norm at most 1.
Theorem 3. Algorithm 1 provides (, 0)-differential pri-
vacy.
This theorem can be quickly proved by some simple
derivations so we put the proof in the supplementary ma-
terial.
Theorem 4. Algorithm 2 provides (, 0)-differential pri-
vacy.
Proof. Assume the outputs for the adjacent inputs X and
Xˆ are identical (denoted A + W0). Here A = 1nXX
T and
Aˆ = 1nXˆXˆ
T . We define the difference matrix ∆ , A−Aˆ =
1
n (vv
T − vˆvˆT ). Actually the privacy guarantee is to bound
the following term:
p(A+W = A+W0)
p(Aˆ+W = A+W0)
=
p(W = W0)
p(W = A+W0 − Aˆ)
=
p(W = W0)
p(W = W0 + ∆)
As W ∼Wd(d+ 1, C), we have that
p(W = W0)
p(W = W0 + ∆)
=
exp[− 12 tr(C−1W0)]
exp[− 12 tr(C−1(W0 + ∆))]
= exp[
1
2
tr(C−1(W0 + ∆))− tr(C−1W0)]
= exp[
1
2
tr(C−1∆)].
Then apply Von Neumann’s trace inequality: For matrices
A,B ∈ Rd×d, denote their ith-largest singular value as
σi(·). Then |tr(AB)| ≤
∑d
i=1 σi(A)σi(B). So that
exp[
1
2
tr(C−1∆)] ≤ exp[1
2
d∑
i=1
σi(C
−1)σi(∆)]
≤ exp[1
2
∥∥C−1∥∥
2
‖∆‖∗].
(1)
Since ∆ = A − Aˆ = 1n (vvT − vˆvˆT ) has rank at most 2,
and by singular value inequality σi+j−1(A+B) ≤ σi(A) +
σj(B), we can bound ‖∆‖∗:
n ‖∆‖∗ ≤ σ1(vvT ) + σ1(−vˆvˆT ) + max{σ1(vvT )
+ σ2(−vˆvˆT ), σ2(vvT ) + σ1(−vˆvˆT )}
= σ1(vv
T ) + σ1(vˆvˆ
T ) + max{σ1(vvT ), σ1(vˆvˆT )}
≤ 3 maxσ1(vvT ) = 3 max
∥∥vvT∥∥
2
= 3 max ‖v‖22 ≤ 3.
In Algorithm 2, the scale matrix C in Wishart distribu-
tion has d same eigenvalues equal to 32n , which implies∥∥C−1∥∥
2
= 2n3 . Substituting these terms in Eq. (1) yields
p(A+W = A+W0)
p(Aˆ+W = A+W0)
≤ exp[1
2
∥∥C−1∥∥
2
‖∆‖∗]
≤ exp[1
2
· 2n
3
· 3
n
] = e.
Utility guarantee
Then we give bounds about how far the noisy results are
from optimal. Since the Laplace and Wishart mechanisms
are both input perturbation methods, their analyses are sim-
ilar.
In order to ensure privacy guarantee, we add a noise ma-
trix to the input data. Such noise may have effects on the
property of the original matrix. For input perturbation meth-
ods, the magnitude of the noise matrix directly determines
how large the effects are. For example, if the magnitude of
the noise matrix is even larger than data, the matrix after
perturbation is surely covered by noise. Better utility bound
means less noise added. We choose the spectral norm of the
noise matrix to measure its magnitude. Since we are investi-
gating the privacy-preserving PCA problem, the usefulness
of the subspace of the top-k singular vectors is mainly cared.
The noise matrix in the Laplace mechanism is constructed
with d
2+d
2 i.i.d random variables of Lap(2d/n). Using the
tail bound for an ensemble matrix in (Tao 2012), we have
that the spectral norm of the noise matrix in Algorithm 1
satisfies ‖L‖2 = O(2d
√
d/n) with high probability.
Then we turn to analyze the Wishart mechanism. We use
the tail bound of the Wishart distribution in (Zhu 2012):
Lemma 1 (Tail Bound of Wishart Distribution). Let W ∼
Wd(m,C). Then for θ ≥ 0, with probability at most
d exp(−θ),
λ1(W ) ≥ (m+
√
2mθ(r + 2) + 2θr)λ1(C)
where r = tr(C)/ ‖C‖2.
In our settings that r = d and m = d + 1, we thus have
that with probability at most d exp(−θ),
λ1(W ) ≥ (d+ 1 +
√
2(d+ 1)(d+ 2)θ + 2θd)λ1(C).
Let θ = c log d(c > 1). Then d exp(−θ) = d1−c. So we
can say with high probability
λ1(W ) = O([d+ 1 +
√
2(d+ 1)(d+ 2)θ + 2θd]λ1(C)).
For convenience, we write
λ1(W ) = O(d log dλ1(C)) = O(3d log d/2n).
We can see that the spectral norm of noise matrix gener-
ated by the Wishart mechanism is O(d log d/n) while the
Laplace mechanism requires O(d
√
d/n). This implies that
the Wishart mechanism adds less noise to obtain privacy
guarantee. We list the present four input perturbation ap-
proaches for comparison. Compared to the state-of-the-art
results about (, δ) case (Dwork et al. 2014), our noise mag-
nitude of O(d log dn ) is obviously worse than their O(
√
d
n ). It
can be seen as the utility gap between (, δ)-DP and (, 0)-
DP.
Table 1: Spectral norm of noise matrix in input perturbation.
Approach Noise magnitude Privacy
Laplace O(d
√
d/n) (, 0)
(Blum et al. 2005) O(d
√
d log d/n) (, δ)
Wishart O(d log d/n) (, 0)
(Dwork et al. 2014) O(
√
d/n) (, δ)
General framework We are talking about the intrin-
sic difference between the Laplace and Wishart mecha-
nisms. The key element is the difference matrix ∆ of
two adjacent matrices. Laplace mechanism adds a noise
matrix according to the `1 sensitivity, which equals to
max ‖∆‖1,1. Thus, the spectral norm of noise matrix is
O(max ‖∆‖1,1
√
d/n). When it comes to the Wishart
mechanism, the magnitude of noise is determined by
‖C‖2. For purpose of satisfying privacy guarantee, we take‖C‖2 = ω(max ‖∆‖∗ /n). Then the spectral norm of noise
matrix is O(max ‖∆‖∗ d log d/n). Consequently, we ob-
tain the following theorem.
Theorem 5. M is a d × d symmetric matrix generated by
some input. For two arbitrary adjacent inputs, the gener-
ated matrices are M and Mˆ . Let ∆ = M − Mˆ . Using the
Wishart mechanism to publish M in differential private man-
ner works better if
max ‖∆‖1,1
max ‖∆‖∗
= ω(
√
d log d);
otherwise the Laplace mechanism works better.
Top-k subspace closeness We now conduct comparison
between our mechanism and the algorithm in (Chaudhuri,
Sarwate, and Sinha 2012). Chaudhuri, Sarwate, and Sinha
(2012) proposed an exponential-mechanism-based method,
which outputs the top-k subspace by drawing a sample from
the matrix Bingham-von Mises-Fisher distribution. Wang,
Wu, and Wu (2013) applied this algorithm to private spec-
tral analysis on graph and showed that it outperforms the
Laplace mechanism for output perturbation. Because of
the scoring function defined, it is hard to directly sample
from the original Bingham-von Mises-Fisher distribution.
Instead, Chaudhuri, Sarwate, and Sinha (2012) used Gibbs
sampling techniques to reach an approximate solution. How-
ever, there is no guarantee for convergence. They check the
convergence heuristically, which may affect the basic pri-
vacy guarantee.
First we provide our result on the top-k subspace close-
ness:
Theorem 6. Let Vˆk be the top-k subspace ofA+W in Algo-
rithm 2. Denote the non-noisy subspace as Vk corresponding
to A. Assume σ1 ≥ σ2 ≥ · · · ≥ σd are singular values of A.
If σk − σk+1 ≥ 2 ‖W‖2, then with high probability∥∥∥VkV Tk − VˆkVˆ Tk ∥∥∥
F
≤ 2
√
k ‖W‖2
σk − σk+1 .
We apply the well-known Davis-Kahan sin θ theo-
rem (Davis 1963) to obtain this result. This theorem char-
acterizes the usefulness of our noisy top-k subspace. Nev-
ertheless, Chaudhuri, Sarwate, and Sinha (2012) only pro-
vided the utility guarantee on the principal eigenvector. So
we can only compare the top-1 subspace closeness, corre-
spondingly.
Before the comparison, we introduce the measure in
(Chaudhuri, Sarwate, and Sinha 2012).
Definition 6. A randomized algorithm A(·) is an (ρ, η)-
close approximation to the top eigenvector if for all data
sets D of n points, output a vector vˆ1 such that
P(〈vˆ1, v1〉 ≥ ρ) ≥ 1− η.
Under this measure, we derive the sample complexity of
the Wishart mechanism.
Theorem 7. If n ≥ 3(d+1+
√
2(d+1)(d+2) log dη+2d log
d
η )
2(1−ρ2)(λ1−λ2) and
ρ ≥
√
2
2 , then the Wishart mechanism is a (ρ, η)-close ap-
proximation to PCA.
Because a useful algorithm should output an eigenvector
making ρ close to 1, our condition of ρ ≥
√
2
2 is quite weak.
Comparing to the sample complexity bound of the algorithm
in (Chaudhuri, Sarwate, and Sinha 2012):
Theorem 8. If n ≥ d(1−ρ)(λ1−λ2) (
log 1η
d +
log 4λ1(1−ρ2)(λ1−λ2) ), then the algorithm in (Chaudhuri,
Sarwate, and Sinha 2012) is a (ρ, η)-close approximation
to PCA.
Our result has a factor up to log d with dropping the term
log λ1λ1−λ2 . Actually, the relationship between d and
λ1
λ1−λ2
heavily depends on the data. Thus, as a special case of top-
k subspace closeness, our bound for the top-1 subspace is
comparable to Chaudhuri, Sarwate, and Sinha’s (2012).
Low rank approximation Here we discuss the compari-
son between the Wishart mechanism and privacy-preserving
rank-k approximation algorithm proposed in (Kapralov and
Talwar 2013; Hardt and Price 2014). PCA can be seen
as a special case of low rank approximation problems.
Kapralov and Talwar (2013) combined the exponential and
Laplace mechanisms to design a low rank approximation al-
gorithm for a symmetric matrix, providing strict guarantee
on convergence. However, the implementation of the algo-
rithm contains too many approximation techniques and it
takes O(d6/) time complexity while our algorithm takes
O(kd2) running time. Hardt and Price (2014) proposed an
efficient meta algorithm, which can be applied to (, δ)-
differentially private PCA. Additionally, they provided a
(, 0)-differentially private version.
We need to point out that the definition of adjacent matrix
in privacy-preserving low rank approximation is different
from ours (our definition is the same as (Dwork et al. 2014;
Chaudhuri, Sarwate, and Sinha 2012)). In the definition
(Kapralov and Talwar 2013; Hardt and Price 2014), two ma-
trices A and B are called adjacent if ‖A−B‖2 ≤ 1, while
we restrict the difference to a certain form vvT − vˆvˆT . In
fact, we make a stronger assumption so that we are dealing
with a case of less sensitivity. This difference impacts the
lower bound provided in (Kapralov and Talwar 2013).
For the consistence of comparison, we remove the term
1
n in Algorithm 2, which means we use the XX
T for PCA
instead of 1nXX
T . This is also used by Dwork et al. (2014).
Applying Lemma 1 in (Achlioptas and McSherry 2001),
we can immediately have the following theorem:
Theorem 9. Suppose the original matrix is A = XXT and
Aˆk is the rank-k approximation of output by the Wishart
mechanism. Denote the k-th largest eigenvalue of A as λk.
Then ∥∥∥A− Aˆk∥∥∥
2
≤ λk+1 +O(d log d

).
Kapralov and Talwar (2013) provided a bound of O(k
3d
 )
and Hardt and Price (2014) provided O(k
3
2 d log2 d
 ) for the
same scenario. If k3 is larger than log d, our algorithm will
work better. Moreover, our mechanism has better bounds
than that of Hardt and Price (2014) while both algorithms
are computationally efficient. Kapralov and Talwar (2013)
established a lower bound of O(kd ) according to their defi-
nition of adjacent matrix. If replaced with our definition, the
lower bound will become O(d ). The details will be given
in the in supplementary material. So our mechanism is near-
optimal.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have studied the problem of privately publishing a
symmetric matrix and provided an approach for choosing
Laplace or Wishart noise properly. In the scenario of PCA,
our Wishart mechanism adds less noise than the Laplace,
which leads to better utility guarantee. Compared with the
privacy-preserving PCA algorithm in (Chaudhuri, Sarwate,
and Sinha 2012), our mechanism has reliable rank-k util-
ity guarantee while the former (Chaudhuri, Sarwate, and
Sinha 2012) only has rank-1. For rank-1 approximation
we have the comparable performance on sample complex-
ity. Compared with the low rank approximation algorithm
in (Kapralov and Talwar 2013), the bound of our mecha-
nism does not depend on k. Moreover, our method is more
tractable computationally. Compared with the tractable algo-
rithm in (Hardt and Price 2014), our utility bound is better.
Since input perturbation only publishes the matrix for
PCA, any other procedure can take the noisy matrix as in-
put. Thus, our approach has more flexibility. While other
entry-wise input perturbation techniques make the covari-
ance not be positive semidefinite, in our case the noisy co-
variance matrix still preserves this property.
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Supplementary material
A Proof of privacy guarantee
The basic settings are the same as section 4.
Proof of Theorem 3
In order to prove Theorem 3, we first give the following
lemma.
Lemma 2. For mechanism M(D) = 1nDD
T , the `1 sensi-
tivity s1 satisfies
d
n
< s1(M) <
2d
n
.
Proof. Suppose v = (p1, · · · , pd)T and vˆ = (q1, · · · , qd)T .
Then the `1 sensitivity of M(D) can be converted to the
following optimization problem:
s1(M) = max
1
n
∑
1≤i,j≤d
|pipj − qiqj |,
subject to
d∑
i=1
p2i ≤ 1,
d∑
i=1
q2i ≤ 1.
Setting pi = 1√d and qi = 0 for i = 1, . . . , d, we can have
a lower bound s1(M) ≥ dn . Then applying the triangle in-
equality, we have the upper bound:∑
1≤i,j≤d
|pipj − qiqj | <
∑
1≤i,j≤d
|pipj |+ |qiqj |
= 2
∑
1≤i,j≤d
|pipj | ≤ 2d
n
.
Now applying Lemma 2 to Theorem 1 immediately ob-
tains the privacy guarantee for the Laplace mechanism.
B Proof of utility guarantee
Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. We use the following two lemmas.
Lemma 3 (Davis-Kahan sin θ theorem (Davis 1963)). Let
the k-th eigenvector of A and Aˆ be vk and vˆk. Denote Pk =
k∑
i=1
vkv
T
k and Pˆk =
k∑
i=1
vˆkvˆk
T . If λk(A) > λk+1(Aˆ), then
∥∥∥Pk − Pˆk∥∥∥
2
≤
∥∥∥A− Aˆ∥∥∥
2
λk(A)− λk+1(Aˆ)
.
Lemma 4 (Weyl’s inequality). If M , H and P are d × d
Hermitian matrices such that M = H + P . Let the k-th
eigenvalues of M , H and P be µk, νk and ρk, respectively.
For i ∈ [n], we have
νi + ρd ≤ µi ≤ νi + ρ1.
In our case,A and Aˆ are both symmetric positive semidef-
inite (because of the property of Wishart distribution). So the
eigenvalues equal to singular values. Then we use Lemma 4
with A = H and W = P . We obtain
σi(A+W ) ≤ σi(A) + σ1(W ) = σi(A) + ‖W‖2 .
Applying Lemma3 with A = A and Aˆ = A+W leads to∥∥∥Pk − Pˆk∥∥∥
2
=
∥∥∥VkV Tk − VˆkVˆ Tk ∥∥∥
2
≤ ‖W‖2
λk(A)− λk+1(A+W )
≤ ‖W‖2
λk(A)− λk+1(A)− ‖W‖2
=
‖W‖2
σk − σk+1 − ‖W‖2
.
Under the assumption σk−σk+1 ≥ 2 ‖W‖2, we finally have∥∥∥VkV Tk − VˆkVˆ Tk ∥∥∥
2
≤ 2 ‖W‖2
σk − σk+1 .
Using the property∥∥∥VkV Tk − VˆkVˆ Tk ∥∥∥
F
≤
√
k
∥∥∥VkV Tk − VˆkVˆ Tk ∥∥∥
2
we finish the proof.
Proof of Theorem 7
We are going to find the condition on sample complexity to
satisfy (ρ, η)-close approximation.
Proof. Set k = 1 in Theorem 6. Then∥∥∥V1V T1 − Vˆ1Vˆ T1 ∥∥∥
F
=
∥∥v1vT1 − vˆ1vˆT1 ∥∥F
= tr[(v1v
T
1 − vˆ1vˆT1 )(v1vT1 − vˆ1vˆT1 )T ]
= 2− 2(vT1 vˆ1)2 ≤
2 ‖W‖2
λ1 − λ2 .
The condition λ1 − λ2 ≥ 2 ‖W‖2 requires the last term
to have a upper bound of 1, which implies |vT1 vˆ1| ≥
√
2
2 .
Let η = d exp(−θ), which is θ = log dη , we have that with
probability 1− η,
(vT1 vˆ1)
2 ≥ 1− ‖W‖2
λ1 − λ2
= 1− (d+ 1 +
√
2(d+ 1)(d+ 2)θ + 2θd)λ1(C)
λ1 − λ2
= 1−
3(d+ 1 +
√
2(d+ 1)(d+ 2) log dη + 2d log
d
η )
2n(λ1 − λ2) .
Under the condition
n ≥ 3(d+1+
√
2(d+1)(d+2) log dη+2d log
d
η )
2(1−ρ2)(λ1−λ2)
(vT1 vˆ1)
2 ≥ 1− (1− ρ2) = ρ2
Which yields Pr(vT1 vˆ1 ≥ ρ) ≥ 1− η.
C Lower bound for low rank approximation
We mainly follow the construction of Kapralov and Talwar
(2013) and make a slight modification to fit into our defini-
tion of adjacent matrices.
Lemma 5. Define Ckδ (Y ) = {S ∈ Gk,d :∥∥Y Y T − SST∥∥
2
≤ δ}. For each δ > 0 there exists fam-
ily F = {Y 1, · · · , Y N} with N = 2Ω(k(d−k) log 1/δ), where
Y i ∈ Gk,d such that Ckδ (Y i) ∩ Ckδ (Y j) = ∅ for i 6= j.
Theorem 10. Suppose the original matrix is A = XXT
and Aˆk is the rank-k approximation of output by the any
-differential private mechanism. Denote the k-th largest
eigenvalue of A as λk. Then∥∥∥A− Aˆk∥∥∥
2
≤ λk+1 + Ω(d/).
Proof. Take a set F = {Y 1, · · · , Y N} in Lemma 5. Con-
struct a series of matrices Ai = γYiY Ti where i ∈ [N ].
Then
EAi
[ ∥∥∥Ai − Aˆik∥∥∥
2
]
≤ δγ.
Let Aˆik = YˆiΣˆYˆi
T
. Then letting A˜ik = YˆiYˆi
T
, we have
EAi
[ ∥∥∥Ai − A˜ik∥∥∥
2
]
≤ 2δγ.
Using Markov’s inequality leads to
Pr
Ai
[ ∥∥∥Ai − A˜ik∥∥∥
2
≤ 4δγ
]
>
1
2
.
Here is the main difference between our definition and
Kapralov and Talwar (2013). They consider the distance
from Ai to Aj is at most 2γ since
∥∥Ai∥∥
2
≤ γ. In our frame-
work,Ai is a dataset consisting of γ data groups, each one is
Y i. Changing Ai to Aj means replacing γk data points with
brand new ones. So we consider the distance is at most 2γk.
The algorithm should put at least half of the probability
mass into Ck4δ(Y
i). Meanwhile, to satisfy the privacy guar-
antee
Pr{M(Ai) ∈ Ck4δ(Y i)}
Pr{M(Aj) ∈ Ck4δ(Y i)}
≤ e2γk
So Pr{M(Aj) ∈ Ck4δ(Y i)} ≥ 12e−2γk, we have
1
2
e−2γk · 2Ω(k(d−k) log 1/δ) ≤ 1
Which implies γ = Ω(d log(1/δ)/) and completes our
proof.
